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Introduction 
 
This paper will explore the changes proposed by the recent Illinois Reform Commission, 
many of which have been tried in other states.  Within the political science literature there is 
much discussion on how these policies work.  Recent polls in Illinois show that voters of the 
state are deeply dissatisfied with their state government (Crow, 2010; Leonard, 2010, The Paul 
Simon Public Policy Institute, 2010).  Thus, any measures which may reduce the level of 
alienation and distrust are worth examining.  This paper will review the available and relevant 
literature on the Illinois Reform Commission’s recommendations and apply it to Illinois in an 
attempt to weigh the possible benefits of adopting such policies.   
 
The 1970 Illinois Constitution established strong, professional government institutions.  
In fact, Illinois’ legislature is routinely ranked among the most professional and its governor is 
ranked among the strongest in the United States.  Major state elected officials in the legislative 
and executive branches are full-time, career politicians. These officials are provided ample staff 
and resources to carry out the business of the state.  Over time, proponents argue that 
government officials build important skills and expertise to grapple with the complex issues 
facing today’s large governments like the state of Illinois.  In addition to these complex issues, 
officials are also focused on a very salient topic to any elected official, reelection.  This 
“reelection connection” theoretically serves to hold professional politicians accountable to 
voters.  However, as elected officials continue their career, they are awarded advantages just for 
being an incumbent.  Due to this and other factors, political scientists find that there is greater 
public dissatisfaction with more professionalized legislatures like the Illinois General Assembly 
(Squire, 1993; Hamman, 2006).  Recent Illinois polls suggest the public believes that long tenure 
creates opportunities for the office holders to partner with special interests and to pursue agendas 
inconsistent with the public interest.  Such reforms as term limits are argued for due to their 
potential in changing these relationship dynamics.  
 
With the exception of several prominent Illinois officials who rose to the highest offices 
in the land, an assessment of Illinois politicians is discouraging.  The Illinois public is well aware 
that the state has seen a great amount of corruption in its recent history.  Even President Barack 
Obama’s run for the Presidency was overshadowed by Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s 
highly publicized scandal in which he became the second consecutive governor of Illinois to be 
arrested (Suddath, 2008).  Three modern Illinois governors have served time in prison after their 
term in the Governor’s Office, but scandal runs deeper in Illinois and highly salient cases like 
these may just be the tip of the iceberg.  For instance Gradel, Simpson, and Zimelis (2009) report 
that since 1970 there have been 1,000 Illinois public officials and businessmen convicted of 
public corruption.  A report from the Corporate Crime Reporters which reviewed all corruption 
convictions in all states from 1997 to 2006 ranked Illinois seventh highest with most convictions.  
Only Florida, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, California, and Ohio convicted more.  Weighting 
the total figure by the number of public corruption convictions per 100,000 residents resulted in 
Illinois ranking sixth (Corporate Crime Reporter, 2007).  However, a quick review of Illinois 
citizens’ attitudes would surely reveal surprise that Illinois is not in fact number one.   
 
An examination of convictions in Illinois over the past 30 years shows that corruption is 
not a particularly recent problem in Illinois politics.  Figure 1 reports data from the Department 
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of Justice’s Public Integrity Section on the annual number of public officials who were convicted 
of public corruption.  Since the number of public officials in Illinois has not changed much since 
the adoption of single member legislative districts, the actual number of convictions is used [For 
comparative analyses of the states predicting public conviction rates see: Meier and Holbrook, 
1992; Nice, 1983; Johnston, 1983].  The variability in the trend reflects the fact that litigation 
often exceeds a year’s time.  Generally, the figure shows sustained conviction rates from 1978 to 
2008 with the highest levels coming between the mid 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division. Compiled from the 1989, 1999, and 2008 
“Report(s) to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.”             
 
Many blame pervasive corruption on the inability of legislative leadership and partisan 
opponents to effectively manage and fund essential state services.  For instance, a long-standing 
issue has been the state’s inability to redistrict every ten years.  Since the adoption of the 1970 
Illinois constitution, the state has resorted to literally drawing a name out of a hat, President 
Abraham Lincoln’s stovepipe hat to be exact, a jaw-dropping three times (Jackson and Prozesky, 
2005).  More recently, the budget deficit is causing a state-wide, financial crisis.  The state is 
falling behind in making legally required contributions to state employee pension funds, 
payments to state vendors, and general upkeep of facilities and services statewide.  Lacking an 
analogous hat-trick for “solving” Illinois’ budget crisis, finances have been pushed to the brink 
as inadequate state revenues threatened to seriously disrupt or even close major state institutions 
such as universities and correctional centers.  Despite these and many other problems, the 
governor and state legislature appeared more focused on the 2010 general elections, recessing for 
the fall without addressing the budget shortfalls either in terms of significantly cutting 
expenditures or raising new revenues.  In lieu of action, state officials borrowed yet more money 
to cover short-term, operating expenses.  Illinois elected officials clearly have failed to engage 
some of the most fundamental governing issues.   
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Following the impeachment of former Illinois Governor Blagojevich for his pay-to-play 
scheme to fill the vacated senate seat of President Barack Obama, newly appointed Governor, 
Pat Quinn appointed the Illinois Reform Commission and charged it to “recommend meaningful 
ethics reform for the State of Illinois in one hundred days” (Illinois Reform Commission, 2009).  
The Commission heard testimony on behalf of recall, term limits, and to some extent referenda 
from a variety of state scholars and other interested parties.  The Commission first looked into 
direct recall, in which the citizenry could petition to remove an elected official from office.  
Though the recall found support among some Commission members, it did not garner unanimous 
support and thus was not recommended.  However, due to the support some members expressed 
for the recall, the Commission stated that it deserved “further study and consideration” (Illinois 
Reform Commission, 2009).  One should also note that Governor Quinn also has championed the 
idea of the recall for some time.  
 
Also presented to the Commission was the idea of Term limits for both the governor and 
the legislature.  Given the relatively recent short tenure of Illinois governors, the commission 
found gubernatorial term limits unjustified.  Legislative term limits did inspire more support.  
But the Commission fell short of recommending general legislative term limits.  Rather, it 
recommended that, like recall, it deserved “further study and consideration” (Illinois Reform 
Commission, 2009).  However, the Commission did recommend that: 
 
…term limits on legislative leadership positions are necessary to 
restore public confidence in Illinois.  Specifically, the Commission 
recommends…amending the Legislature Article of the Illinois 
Constitution to limit a person’s total service in the office of 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, President of the Senate, 
Minority Leader of the House and Minority Leader of the Senate to 
a total of (a) ten years in any one office and (b) fourteen years 
combined in two or more offices (Illinois Reform Commission, 
2009).  
 
 Finally, the Commission heard limited testimony about the promise of the initiative and 
referendum.  Initiatives specifically allow the electorate to petition for a proposal to appear on 
the ballot for the electorate to make a binding vote on the subject.  It is thought that since 
structural reforms, such as term limits, are unpopular with most elected officials, it is unlikely 
they could be passed into law by statute.  This reasoning lead the Reform Commission to 
recommend that the expansion of Illinois’ referendum process should be studied more in depth.   
 
The commission’s recommendations for further study into these reforms may not go far 
enough for Illinoisans who repeatedly say they want meaningful reform.  A Joyce Foundation 
public opinion poll found that more than 60 percent of Illinoisans place corruption as one of their 
top concerns, even over the struggling economy and jobs (Gradel, Simpson, and Zimelis, 2009).  
In the public’s eyes, the corruption goes beyond those elected.  They are pushing for reform that 
will change the culture and the system.  In a recent survey, the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute 
(PSPPI) found that 72 percent believe that Illinois is headed in the wrong direction (Leonard, 
2010).  When questioned directly about several reform proposals the PSPPI poll found that more 
than 64 percent of those who responded strongly favored/favored each proposal.  This is no 
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surprise, as PSPPI Director David Yepsen put it, “You’d have to be living under a rock not to 
understand there have been ethical issues in [Illinois] state government” (Thomas, 2009). 
 
This paper sets out to assess the prospect for one area of reform proposed by the Illinois 
Reform Commission: structural changes in the form of direct democracy practices and term 
limits.  It evaluates both the promise and political feasibility of the initiative, referendum, recall 
and term limits.  In so doing the paper reviews what the literature and experience of other states 
suggest about how these reforms would likely impact Illinois politics and the problems Illinois is 
experiencing.  After reviewing studies of the extent to which political reform has been found to 
affect corruption in other states, the paper takes a more in depth look at each of the proposed 
reforms, what we have learned from experience, and what the prospects are for improving 
Illinois government.  The authors then close by offering their own personal opinion of each of 
these proposals 
 
Reform and Corruption 
 
 Political scientists have taken at least two different approaches to studying factors which 
affect corruption.  Both assume that citizens and elected officials are basically rational and that 
the citizens vote retrospectively (Fiorina, 1981).  Their vote in any given election depends on 
how well they perceive their representatives performed since the previous election.  These 
studies also assume that elected officials will seek the maximum level of “rents” and benefits 
possible that still allows them to retain office (Mayhew, 1974; Meier and Holbrook, 1992).  
Generally speaking, political rent-seeking happens when legislators and special interests attempt 
to acquire benefits through exploitation of the policy making process.  Rather than having 
interests acquire benefits through economic transactions which produce new wealth and benefits 
to the state economy and citizenry, the interests benefit from regulations and legal requirements.  
Legislators engage in rent seeking to the extent voters do not seek to vote them out of office.  
Both studies analyze several potential sources of corruption in addition to institutional reforms 
including historical / cultural factors such as urbanization and political machines, regulatory 
burden and intrusiveness, government size, and transparency (Meier and Holbrook, 1992; Alt 
and Lassen, 2003).  Within these studies, two basic methodologies are used.  One relies on the 
perceptions of those who follow state politics closely.  The other looks at conviction rates of 
elected officials.   
 
The first study this paper will present is that of Alt and Lassen (2003).  Alt and Lassen 
(2003) study the perceptions of local reporters to determine levels of corruption in the states and 
question whether existing institutional factors do enough to check the rent-seeking behavior of 
elected officials and special interests.  For instance, the authors argue that legislatures in a 
representative democracy often bundle issues into single pieces of legislation.  This allows 
legislators to insure that their constituency has a stake in the legislation.  However, this makes it 
difficult for voters to determine their positions on single issues that may be of importance to 
them, thus affecting the ability of voters to make retrospective election-day decisions.  However, 
referenda transfer more responsibility and power to the electorate by allowing the public to vote 
on single policy decisions by unbundling these issues.  This theoretically makes it easier to 
assess an official’s past policy performance and increases the ability of voters to hold them 
accountable.  The authors also explore this as an institutional tool that could possibly help curb 
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the levels of corruption in the United States.  Alt and Lassen find that the unbundling of 
important policy decisions into referenda can explain some decreases in corruption (2003).   
 
 In addition to referenda, Alt and Lassen also analyze the effects of term limits on 
corruption.  Generally speaking proponents of term limits argue that a constant rotation in office 
of elected officials decreases the opportunities for rent-seeking and for politicians to take 
advantage of their legislative privileges.  However, Alt and Lassen also argue that term limits 
allow an elected official to remain unaccountable to the public for their last term in office.  
Paralleling findings elsewhere that term-limited governors often have very different policy 
choices in their last term of office (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995) Alt and Lassen find some 
evidence that term limits are associated with higher levels of corruption (2003).  In general, Alt 
and Lassen find that while institutional reforms, specifically the referendum, can account for 
some decrease in political corruption, other institutional reforms, such as term limits can actually 
increase corruption.  
  
 On the other hand, Meier and Holbrook (1992) focus on the actual number of elected 
officials who are convicted on charges of corruption.  For their study they divide the number of 
convictions by the number of elected officials in the state.  Like Alt and Lassen (2003), Meier 
and Holbrook reason that corruption can be curbed by raising the costs of political corruption to 
levels that are undesirable for politicians by various means like referenda and term limits.  By 
taking this different approach they reached different conclusions.  Although Meier and Holbrook 
analyze similar sources of corruption, institutional explanations did not explain differences in 
corruption levels – that is states with term limits and fewer restrictions on referenda had 
comparable levels of corruption to those that didn’t when other sources were taken into account. 
Their study finds that historical/cultural factors, such as urbanism and a history of political 
machines, best explain corruption (Meier and Holbrook, 1992).    
 
 Overall, these studies report little evidence that institutional reforms such as direct 
democracy and term limits affect corruption.  Referenda seek to take legislative power away 
from elected officials and recall works to prevent corruption by increasing the threat of 
punishment. Term limits however, seem to be “anti-reform”.  By this the authors refer to the 
ability of term limits to actually do the reverse and inhibit corrupt action by those officials who 
are serving their mandated last term in office.  This paper will now turn its focus towards 
examining each reform proposal in more depth. 
  
The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 
 
The basic framework for U.S. government rests on the concept of representative, 
republican government whereby citizen preferences are indirectly translated into policies.  Voters 
have very little direct voice in policy making.  In a republic, the major power of the voters is 
exercised at elections when they can replace one set of leaders with another.  The general 
premise underlying direct democracy is that direct citizen involvement will provide greater 
accountability and less corruption.  The belief is that policy will better reflect overall public 
preferences.  Direct democracy, in terms of the initiative and referendum, gives citizens the 
opportunity to initiate and/or vote directly on legislation.  Recall, another tool of direct 
democracy, allows citizens to remove corrupt or fraudulent officials before they complete a full 
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term of office (Zimmerman, 1986).  In Illinois, the legislature can place an issue before the 
voters in the form of a referendum.  The referendum provides Illinois voters with an opportunity 
either to pass or reject legislation.  Theoretically, having voters decide whether to pass legislation 
in this way gives them the chance to reject undesirable legislation and curb corruption by 
limiting the power of the elected officials on the topic.  
 
State provisions for direct democracy date back over 200 years and over the years they 
have been touted as cures for a variety of political ills (Zimmerman, 1986).  The appeal of direct 
democracy lies in the ability to either quickly withdraw power from elected officials or give 
more direct power to the citizenry.  These measures become most popular when distrust in 
politicians and political institutions is high.  In a sixteen-country study of public attitudes, 
Bowler, Donovan, and Karp (2007) find greater support for direct democracy when there is 
widespread public contempt for government.  State constitutions in the U.S. allow for up to three 
forms of direct democracy: initiative, referendum, and recall.  Initiatives provide the opportunity 
for a predetermined number of citizens to force a vote on a statute, constitutional amendment, or 
ordinance.  In some states citizens may also force the legislature and governor to consider 
legislation.  Referenda require the entire state electorate to either accept or reject a ballot 
proposition.  The referendum gives voters a veto on laws proposed by their government 
representatives.  The recall provides voters with a means for removing elected officials from 
office before the end of their term.  Table 1 (page 10) shows the extent to which these measures 
have been adopted by the states.  
 
The Initiative and Referendum 
  Providing voters with the opportunity to propose new legislation and place it on a 
general election ballot enables citizens to circumvent elected representatives and act directly on 
state legislation.  Supporters of the initiative argue that initiatives allow all voters to have an 
equal and fair say in policy decisions.  Though in theory this may be possible, the reality of 
referenda may not be so unbiased.  Studies on this subject have found that significantly fewer 
people vote for referenda than vote for candidates (Smith, 2009).  There is evidence that suggests 
that voting on an initiative or referendum depends on how controversial an initiative is and how 
many initiatives typically appear on the ballot (Qvortrup 2005; Smith, 2009).  Furthermore, there 
is evidence that those who vote of initiatives and referenda are also less representative of the 
electorate.  Qvortrup (2005) finds that there is an over-representation of college graduates and 
under-representation of the low education levels and those with manual labor occupations.  In 
essence, those who vote for these propositions tend to be older, wealthier, and more conservative 
in terms of the general population (Magleby, 1984).  These inconsistencies in turnout and 
representation, lead to the thought that the referendum is not living up to its potential in terms of 
equality.    
 
Experience shows that political elites (Bowler and Donovan, 2001) and organized 
interests (Magelby, 1984) dominate the initiative process.  Like voting on referenda, the petition 
process is biased toward upper middle class interests as special interests and elites can access 
resources unavailable to average citizens.  Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) found that technical 
requirements such as how great a proportion of the electorate’s signatures is required to place a 
proposition on the ballot dramatically affect average citizen involvement.  For example, it takes 
millions and tens of millions of dollars to qualify a proposal for the popular initiative in a large 
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state like California.  Gerber (1999) argues there is a “populist paradox”, where direct 
democratic institutions designed for the people, are used primarily by interest groups and elites.  
Gerber (1999) finds that organized groups spent over $129 million on campaigns for twenty-nine 
propositions in California in 1988; and $5 million on each initiative in Michigan in 1992.  
Resources, in terms of volunteers and money, allow those with deep pockets to control the 
information available to voters.  The advantages held by elites and special interests may also 
allow them to “crowd out” ordinary citizen interests on the ballot (Smith, 2009).  California 
serves as a particular guide to the woes of the initiative and referendum process.  Special 
interests and elites play such a major part in California’s initiative process, the process has been 
termed by some as the “initiative industrial complex” (Silva, 2000).  This complex refers to the 
major presence that private companies in California have in providing initiative-based services, 
such as “signature gathering, legal services, and campaign consulting” (Silva, 2000).  This is 
hardly a model of grassroots, participatory democracy at work.   
 
Ordinary citizens are at a substantial disadvantage given the complexity and 
informational demands of preparing and filing petitions.  Elite and special interest effects on the 
process in Illinois were evident in the recent failed referendum to hold a constitutional 
convention.  In addition with many special interests pouring funds and resources into a campaign 
to express their support or opposition for a constitutional convention, one group was established 
for the sole purpose of raising money and campaigning against the constitutional convention, the 
Alliance to Protect the Illinois Constitution (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2009).  In another 
instance, a recent effort of the League of Women Voters to put a constitutional amendment on 
the ballot regarding redistricting failed with the lack of money, and ultimately signatures.  The 
ideal of popular initiatives, in which one would imagine a large grassroots mobilization of voters 
seems to be unlikely given petition-signature requirements and thus the amount of resources 
needed to run a successful petitioning campaign.  On the flipside, if these petition requirements 
are lowered to allow more opportunity for the average citizen, it could likely result in a large 
number of initiatives reaching the ballot, yielding unpopular propositions and longer, 
unmanageable ballots.   
 
The substantial role of special interests in the process increases the amount of biased, 
misinformation voters receive.  A lack of voter competence then allows these influences to bias 
outcomes (Cronin, 1989).  Studies of how voters decide to vote in referenda show that 
misinformed or uninformed voters not only vote for provisions they would not agree with if 
properly informed, but if they are unfamiliar or confused enough  they may also choose not to 
vote at all (Cronin, 1989).  So, adding referenda to a ballot does not alleviate the problem of 
voter engagement but may have an opposite, unintended effect (Cronin, 1989).  The hope that 
allowing voters to directly participate in petitioning and voting for single issues has faded in the 
face of the realization that it requires more investment than simply following the conventional 
policy making process.  As such, voters who choose not to know candidates and positions will be 
similarly disengaged from referendum voting (Cronin, 1989).   
 
California’s passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 has long served as the “poster child” for 
those questioning the desirability of direct democracy and the popular initiative.  The proposition 
developed strict requirements for any new taxes passed on California residents.  Specifically, the 
proposition requires two-thirds of the voters’ approval to raise taxes.  The Southern Pacific 
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Railroad and California real estate interests heavily supported this proposition.  The reduction of 
property tax rates and the subsequent cuts in fundamental state services and infrastructure 
maintenance is typically cited to warn of the evils of direct democracy (Smith, 2009).  For 
example, after the passage of Proposition 13, Los Angeles was forced to eliminate summer 
school, close regional occupational training centers, and cut over 50 percent of summer 
recreation programs (McCaffery and Bowman, 2002).  In the 1978-1979 budget year, revenues 
for local governments fell a total of 26 percent (McCaffery and Bowman, 2002).  This forced 
many localities to mirror Los Angeles and cut services to the community, most often beginning 
with education (McCaffery and Bowman, 2002).   
 
The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) has published many articles on the 
initiative in California, and they have been looked to by the state government to recommend 
reform of the initiative process.  Specifically, the PPIC has found that since the passage of 
Proposition 13, local governments have seen a decrease in revenue and have been pushed to find 
alternative source of revenue, often relying on user fees and intergovernmental transfers (Shires, 
1999).  Though the PPIC is cautious to blame Proposition 13 for this, other studies find similar 
results.  Studies of initiative and non-initiative states find that initiative states’ local governments 
increasingly rely on state aid (Magleby, 1998) and user fees and service charges as a source of 
revenue (Matsusaka, 1995).  It is also found that California is not the only initiative-allowing 
state to see voters limit taxes as this has also been done in Massachusetts and Colorado 
(Magleby, 1998).   
 
The limiting of the property tax, and complete elimination of others, raises much concern 
as it is almost common knowledge among local governments that the property tax is a 
significantly more stable source of revenue than user fees or intergovernmental revenues.  
Coupled with this strict limitation on taxes, California voters have also been passing propositions 
to increase spending.  Such is the case with California’s Proposition 98 which required a 
percentage of the general fund and tax revenues for education (Magleby, 1998).  For instance, in 
2003-2004, California initiatives locked in expenditures of about 32 percent of California’s 
budget (Matsusaka, 2003).  Proposition 98, among others creating new programs which require 
funding, coupled with limitations on the tax system have caused hurdles for California to 
increase revenue to accompany its increased expenditures.  As any citizen who has ever balanced 
a checkbook knows, one’s financial situation can be troublesome if you do not have the money 
to pay the bills, as Illinois is quickly finding out.  California is undoubtedly having the same 
difficulties, finding itself currently in a state of financial disrepair.  Though, some have argued 
that the initiative process is not as significant a cause to California’s financial situation as some 
might believe (Matsusaka, 2003) it would be impossible to argue that the initiative process has 
had no effect in contributing to its current financial state especially when coupled with the fact 
that other states with direct democracy are also having financial problems (“Direct Democracy: 
The Tyranny of the Majority,” 2009).   
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Table 1: States with the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 
  Statutes Constitution   
State  Initiative Popular 
Referendum 
Initiative 
Recall 
Alaska I* Yes - Yes 
Arizona D Yes D Yes 
Arkansas D Yes D - 
California D Yes D Yes 
Colorado D Yes D Yes 
Florida - - - - 
Georgia - - - Yes 
Idaho D Yes - Yes 
Illinois - - D - 
Kansas - - - Yes 
Louisiana - - - Yes 
Maine I Yes - - 
Maryland - Yes - - 
Massachusetts I Yes I - 
Michigan I Yes D Yes 
Minnesota - - - Yes 
Mississippi - - I - 
Missouri D Yes D - 
Montana D Yes D Yes 
Nebraska D Yes D - 
Nevada I Yes D Yes 
New Jersey - - - Yes 
New Mexico - Yes - - 
North Dakota D Yes D Yes 
Ohio I Yes D - 
Oklahoma D Yes D - 
Oregon D Yes D Yes 
Rhode Island - - - Yes 
South Dakota D Yes D - 
Utah D & I Yes - - 
Washington D & I Yes - Yes 
Wisconsin       Yes 
Wyoming I* Yes - - 
Initiative – a law or constitutional amendment introduced by citizens through a petition 
process either to the legislature or directly to the voters. 
D – Direct Initiative; proposals that qualify go directly on the ballot 
I – Indirect Initiative; proposals are submitted to the legislature, which has an opportunity to 
act on the proposed legislation.  The initiative question will subsequently go on the ballot if 
the legislature rejects it, submits a different proposal or takes no action. 
I* -- Alaska and Wyoming’s initiative processes are usually considered indirect.  However, 
instead of requiring that an initiative be submitted to the legislature for action, they only 
require that an initiative cannot be placed on the ballot until after a legislative session has 
convened and adjourned. 
Popular Referendum – a process by which voters may petition to demand a popular vote on a 
new law passed by the legislature. 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
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While there are problems with the initiative process, some studies question how well the 
woes of Proposition 13 characterize the dynamics of direct democracy today.  For instance, 
Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) find considerable evidence that those who vote on initiative and 
referendum questions are more fiscally responsible and more competent than previous research 
suggests.  Contrary to much of the earlier research, they find that voters do not vote for bad 
policies.  However, with the initiative and referendum campaigns there are no obligatory 
hearings, committee markups, or debates among elected officials and experts from the various 
constituencies potentially affected by proposed legislation.  The referendum process is fairly 
finite, narrowly leading to a “yes” or “no” vote.  There are no allowances for negotiations or 
compromise (Smith, 2009).  Therefore, no matter how informed the electorate is on the question, 
it is likely that the nature of one question being submitted for a binding up or down vote with 
little debate lends itself to mediocrity at best and bad policies at worst.   
 
Furthermore, when passed, initiatives and referenda often lack oversight. When the 
legislature passes a law, it is obviously more likely to see that the law is carried out and 
implemented properly.  However, if through initiative, the citizenry pass a law, the legislature 
might be inclined to ignore it or not insure its implementation (Smith, 2009).  Successful citizen-
initiated campaigns often find opposition if the passage of the proposition is deemed undesirable 
by the governor or the legislature (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004).  A study of California’s winning 
initiatives find that some are often not even enforced or implemented after being passed.  
Proposition 63, establishing English as the official language of California, which passed among 
the voters was never fully implemented in the state (Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and Kiewiet, 
2001).  Therefore, even if well-informed and successful, citizens’ initiatives might not hold 
enough weight to insure their implementation, negating the benefits of such a campaign 
altogether.  
 
These hurdles, elite and special interest influence, voter competency, and oversight 
issues, all boil down to one issue, how to operate a representative democracy coupled with direct 
democracy institutions.   In essence, our representative democracy is based on principals of 
equality and minority representation.  Direct democratic tools including the initiative, 
referendum, and recall circumvent our constitutionally established representative democracy by 
allowing  a majority of voters who vote on these provisions, a minority of the electorate 
(Qvortrup 2005; Smith, 2009), to pass or veto legislation and, in the case of the recall, throw out 
elected officials.  In a representative democracy, elected representatives vote on legislation that 
affects their constituents.  Ideally, these representatives will listen to their constituents and vote 
on legislation accordingly.  However, with direct democratic tools, those who vote on the 
provision are making decisions for the whole state.  Even James Madison in the 51st Federalist 
Paper warned that “if a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will 
be insecure” (Madison, 1788).  This is one important reason a representative democracy was 
established in the United States Constitution and the dangers of direct democracy are as real 
today as they were then as many provisions target minorities such as gays, California Proposition 
8 (“Direct Democracy: The Tyranny of the Majority,” 2009), and non-English speaking 
residents, California Proposition 63 (Gerber et al., 2001). 
 
Through these studies we see that while initiatives and referenda seem desirable, in 
practice they tend to be less promising.  While it is interesting to note that no state with the 
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initiative or referendum has ever voted to get rid of the direct democratic tool (Lupia and 
Matsusaka, 2004), many approved initiatives have been challenged in court.  In California 
between 1960 and 1990, 65 percent of the approved initiatives were challenged in the state or 
federal court (Miller, 1999).  Of the 36 cases challenged, eleven were invalidated in part and 
seven were thrown out entirely (Miller, 1999).  
 
Recall 
The recall allows citizens to petition for and then vote on the question of removing an 
elected official from office before his or her term expires.  In contrast to the initiative and 
referendum which attempt to preempt circumstances in which elected officials can abuse their 
power, the recall seeks to deter the abuse of power by threatening removal if they misstep and 
penalizing those who do.  Some state provisions offer a short honeymoon period, usually six 
months to a year, for legislators or statewide officials before they can be recalled (Zimmerman, 
1986).  This provision attempts to control the volatile emotions of the electorate, a concern of the 
use of the recall in general (Zimmerman, 1996).   
 
 Critics also caution that a relatively uninformed or misinformed public and the ability of 
highly organized, well supported interests to manipulate such an electorate compromise its 
effectiveness (Zimmerman, 1996).  In this sense the criticisms mirror those of direct democracy 
more generally.  Rather than better reflect overall public preferences, policy created through 
direct democracy continues to be biased and corrupted by elite and special interests.  In addition, 
the recall, like the impeachment process when it applies to an executive official, can effectively 
paralyze government.  The recall of California Governor Gray Davis in 2003 demonstrated how 
volatile its use can be (Bowler and Cain, 2006).  Governor Gray Davis was one year into his 
second term when voter anger boiled over against him.  At this time the voters were enraged 
from excessively high electric rates, which had been caused by Enron’s manipulation of the 
market, and a grave budget deficit.  As often is the case, the voters blamed Governor Davis for 
the state’s decaying situation and a recall soon followed.  The recall contributes to an atmosphere 
in which the volatile emotions of the voters may supplant rational decision-making.  
Furthermore, too frequent exercise of the recall, whether or not successful, will likely deter 
potential innovative candidates from running for office.  It may also unnecessarily restrain 
elected officials and increase costs from having to run additional special elections (Zimmerman, 
1996).  It is also interesting to note that even after Governor Davis was recalled and Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger took his place the state’s situation has not recovered fully.  Governor 
Schwarzenegger is still battling a large budget deficit and will leave office next year with 
extremely low job approval ratings.   
 
As with the initiative, Citrin and Cohen (2006) find that one of the biggest challenges for 
Californians in their last recall election was to find adequate resources to pursue the campaign.  
This enabled individuals and organizations with deep pockets to dominate the process.  In 
California’s recall, one elite, California Republican Congressman Darrel Issa, primarily financed 
the petitioning and recall campaign (“Recall in California,” 2004).  However, despite the obvious 
bias and challenge of elites and interests dominating the process, Alvarez, Kiewiet, and Sinclair 
(2006) found that for the most part those who voted on the recall of then-Governor Gray Davis 
and the following replacement questions made informed decisions.  This is especially surprising 
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since Stone and Datta (2004) found that prominent newspapers all framed the recall in a negative 
light and opposed the idea of having a recall election.   
 
 Cain, Anderson, and Eaton (2006) studied signature thresholds, scheduling, and ballot 
formats to see if they advantage interests.  Just as with initiatives and propositions, the number of 
signatures needed to get the recall question on the ballot can determine which potential sponsors 
are allowed in the process.  This percentage can be based on the number of registered voters in 
the state or the number of voters who turned out in the last election.  Somewhat counter 
intuitively, studies find that the number of signatures required does not matter very much in-so-
far as whether the threshold is met for placing a proposition on a statewide ballot as much as it 
may on the local level (Cain, Anderson, and Eaton, 2006).  In some local-level recall campaigns, 
where thresholds may be easier to obtain, some of the reasons for a recall getting on the ballot 
may be frivolous, often initiated due to the grievances of a few.  However, the same study also 
found that the number of cases that were initiated for personal reasons were minimal and much 
more successful at the local level than at the state level (Cain, Anderson, and Eaton, 2006).  
Though it is realized that there was only a limited number of these cases, it does raise awareness 
of the possibility of the abuse of the recall.  
 
 It is also important to consider the timing and format of recall votes.  Generally there 
should be provisions prohibiting a recall either too early or too late in a term of office.  There 
should also be a limit on the number of times a recall can be attempted against an individual and 
the reasons for holding a recall, as well as when a recall election should be scheduled.  The 
timing of recall elections could influence who is likely to vote.  For instance, if the recall is on 
the primary election ballot then party activists and the most politically passionate voters are 
likely to participate - neither of which represents the average voter.  If a separate election were 
held for the sole purpose of the recall, we might also expect those who participate to be only 
passionate voters or in general not those who would be expected to turnout in a general election, 
as this is the case seen in primary elections.  
 
Lastly, Cain, Anderson, and Eaton (2006) studied ballot formats among the states.  They 
found three different formats, one in which the recall and replacement candidate questions are 
separate but on the same ballot, found in California and Colorado.  The second format has a list 
of replacement candidates including the incumbent on one ballot, found in Arizona, Nevada, 
North Dakota, and Wisconsin, and the third most popular format has two separate elections, one 
for the recall and another for the replacement candidates, if needed (Cain, Anderson, and Eaton, 
2006).  Due to its setup, the first and third format will require the incumbent to gain the majority 
of the vote on the recall question to remain in office, whereas the second would require only a 
plurality of the vote.  Even with the limited number of recall cases studied, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the second format favors the incumbent the most.  However, they also 
find that when the recall and replacement are separated into two elections it becomes less “user-
friendly.”   
 
Though these questions are still of concern, what can we learn from the infamous 
California recall?  As Cain, Anderson, and Eaton (2006) suggest, the format of the ballot did not 
bode well for incumbent Gray Davis.  However, with 135 replacement candidates appearing on 
the ballot and the confusing ballot setup it is still found that voters were able to make an 
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informed vote (Alvarez, Kiewiet, and Sinclair, 2006).  Given that Arnold Schwarzenegger was a 
famous former movie star and political activist, it is no surprise that he was a plausible 
replacement candidate.  However, with so many candidates on the ballot, it should be noted that 
Schwarzenegger  did not gain a majority of the vote, but rather a plurality as the votes were split 
between three other contenders (“Recall in California, 2004).  The format of the ballot in 
California allowed the voters to throw out Governor Davis and replace him with Schwarzenegger 
in one stroke.  However, with separate elections and special elections in other states the process 
is more complicated.   
 
As a tool against corruption, a key attraction of the initiative and referendum is their 
ability to take the power out of elected officials’ hands and thus reduce the possibility of 
corruption.  The recall in turn deters political corruption and punishes those who abuse their 
powers.  Many oberservers, for example, felt that if the option was available, Governor Rod 
Blagojevich would have been recalled after his arrest in December of 2008.  However, the 
legislature impeached and removed Governor Blagojevich in January of 2009 without the 
assistance of the recall option.  What these and other studies tend to show is that the initiative, 
referendum, and to some extent the recall, are not likely to help control political corruption as 
they are still susceptible to the same influences as conventional policy making and 
administration.  The dominant roles of special interests and especially the role of money are 
problems endemic to both forms of democracy.  At the very least, if these structures are not 
carefully crafted it is unlikely they will have much more success in curbing corruption than the 
normal representative processes. 
 
Term Limits 
 
 Term limits are commonplace in some aspects of American government.  Since the 
passage of the 22nd Amendment in 1951, the president is limited to serving two terms and a 
number of states at various points over our history have limited the number of terms their 
governors may serve.  The current U.S. legislative term limits movement, however, began 
relatively recently in the late 1980s and stems from public dissatisfaction with high legislative re-
election rates and entrenched state legislative leaders.  Mooney (2007) points out that 19 of 23 
states that had the initiative adopted term limits responding, in part, to a populist movement 
spearheaded by activist Paul Jacob beginning in the early 1990s. The movement to limit the 
terms of state legislators coincided with growing dissatisfaction with professional politicians.  
Over this period, the states also limited the terms of governors, judges, and other statewide 
officials with 52 such initiatives appearing on state ballots and voters approving 85 percent of 
them  (Mooney, 2007).   In the aftermath, four state supreme courts overturned and two 
legislatures repealed term limits resulting in 15 states which currently limit the terms of their 
legislators.  
  
 One such case that was brought to the United States Supreme Court was a case in which 
the Arkansas electorate passed an initiative placing term limits on their United States 
Congressmen and state representatives.  This is unsurprising since Congress repeatedly scores 
low on public job approval ratings.  In 1992, Arkansas passed an initiative establishing this term 
limit, however the question on term limits for Congress soon made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
In the U.S. Term Limits v Thornton case, the question was whether citizens of a state could alter 
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rules placed on the election of members of Congress, which are explained in the U.S. 
Constitution (U.S. Term Limits v Thornton, 2010).  However, in a 5-4 ruling the Court found this 
act unconstitutional.  This decision was made on the proposition that these term limits would 
likely handicap certain candidates and would indirectly impose additional qualifications for 
running for Congress.  This however also might be considered secondary to the fact that allowing 
states to add to the Constitution was deemed unconstitutional (U.S. Term Limits v Thornton, 
2010).  It is interesting that the Supreme Court would make such a decision, fully 
comprehending that term limits would put certain candidates at a disadvantage and thus were not 
permissible for members of Congress. 
 
Proponents argue that term limits will directly affect governments in many positive ways.  
They claim that term limits will reduce corruption by forcing out career politicians, make 
elections between candidates more competitive, increase the number of candidates on the ballot, 
make state legislatures more socially and economically diverse, reduce the focus of legislators on 
their individual districts, and decrease the influence interest groups have in the legislature.  
Accompanied with these expectations, the authors also find some unexpected affects of 
legislative term limits. 
 
Table 2 shows that nine states currently have consecutive term limits and six states have 
lifetime bans (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2009).  
  
Table 2: States with Legislative Term Limits 
  House Senate   
State 
Consecutive (C) 
or Lifetime (L) 
Year 
Enacted Limit 
Year of 
Impact Limit 
Year of 
Impact 
% 
Voted 
Yes 
MAINE C  1993 8 1996 8 1996 67.6 
CALIFORNIA L 1990 6 1996 8 1998 52.2 
COLORADO C 1990 8 1998 8 1998 71 
ARKANSAS L 1992 6 1998 8 2000 59.9 
MICHIGAN L 1992 6 1998 8 2002 58.8 
FLORIDA C 1992 8 2000 8 2000 76.8 
OHIO C 1992 8 2000 8 2000 68.4 
SOUTH DAKOTA C 1992 8 2000 8 2000 63.5 
MONTANA C 1992 8 2000 8 2000 67 
ARIZONA C 1992 8 2000 8 2000 74.2 
* MISSOURI L 1992 8 2002 8 2002 75 
OKLAHOMA L 1990 12 2004 12 2004 67.3 
NEBRASKA C 2000 n/a n/a 8 2006 56 
LOUISIANA C 1995 12 2007 12 2007 76 
**NEVADA L 1996 12 2010 12 2010 70.4 
* Because of special elections, term limits were effective in 2000 for eight current members of the House and one 
Senator in 1998. 
**The Nevada Legislative Council and Attorney General have ruled that Nevada's term limits cannot be applied to 
those legislators elected in the same year term limits were passed (1996). They first apply to persons elected in 1998. 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
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Turnover/Electoral Competition  
Support for term limits grows out of a frustration that career politicians take advantage of 
their position and connections to circumvent the public interest.  Rather than serving as an 
accountability mechanism, the “reelection connection” turns into little more than incumbency 
advantage whereby career legislators run for reelection unchallenged by credible, quality 
candidates.  The worry is that legislators spend more time and energy ensuring their reelection 
than on making good public policy.  Term limits ensure turnover in the membership of 
legislators.  By limiting the tenure of legislators, term limits prevent legislators from pursuing 
legislative careers and limit legislative professionalism by restricting the time any one person can 
be in the legislature.  Term limits force more competitive, open-seat elections, and provide voters 
with more choices.  Some even argue that not only will there be more competition, but that the 
door will be opened to candidates of more diverse backgrounds and ideas as the opportunities for 
being elected to legislatures increase. 
 
Many worry, however, that forcing elected officials out of office doesn’t necessarily 
ensure a more representative, accountable legislature.  An examination of other highly 
professionalized legislatures like Illinois’ suggests these concerns may be legitimate.  For 
instance, the California electorate found it necessary to adopt term limits after FBI investigations 
of elected officials and a record delay in passing the state budget.  While subsequent elections for 
the lower house were somewhat more competitive, with more open seats and more candidates 
appearing on the ballot, the author of one study could not credit this effect entirely to term limits 
(Clucas, 2003).  In a study of the Michigan legislature, Sarbough-Thomspon et al. (2004) 
actually found an increase in the incumbency advantage.  For the terms prior to their limit, 
incumbents running for their next term won more handily than they did before term limits as 
challengers were waiting for open seat election.  Though turnover is inherent in term limits, 
increased electoral competition is not.   
 
Legislative Composition 
Proponents argue that term limits will diversify legislatures but it seems the literature 
provides relatively weak evidence to support their claim.  For instance, Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
(1998) find that there is little difference in the professional backgrounds, income levels, 
educational levels, and ideologies of legislators after term limits, as compared to before term 
limits.  Many legislators were simply rotating up, and moving to higher office and thus could still 
be termed as career politicians.  And while Clucas (2003) finds the number of Latino and women 
legislators increased in California, the change had less to do with the adoption of term limits than 
factors responsible for national trends in the numbers of women and minorities gaining seats.  
Sarbough-Thompson et al., (2004) also report mixed findings.  After an initial influx of younger 
legislators, the ages of legislators eventually returned to pre term limit levels.  They observe the 
number of older legislators holding constant while the age of newly elected legislators increased.  
The study also mirrored Clucas (2003) and found an increase in the diversity of the California 
legislature but did not in the Michigan legislature.  Instead they found a decrease in ethnic 
minorities and women, but point out the decrease may be due to Republican rule of the 
legislature and not term limits.  In the former instance they also entertain the possibility that 
Democratic control could have contributed to the increased diversity found in California. 
 
17 
 
Legislative Performance  
Many legislative scholars are concerned that term limits can seriously compromise 
legislative performance and have focused on the experience of legislative leaders and committee 
chairs.  In the legislative process, legislative leadership and committee chairs serve as 
“gatekeepers” that help build coalitions, broker compromises between legislative factions, and  
filter out unsupported or poorly formulated legislation in committee hearings so the chamber’s 
time is not wasted on the floor with superfluous bills.  Overall, term limits appear to weaken the 
effectiveness of leadership and lessen the role of committee chairs and their committees in the 
legislative process for professional and nonprofessional legislatures alike.   
 
Studies find a considerable drop in leadership experience after term limits.  For instance 
in California, with few exceptions, the legislative leaders before term limits had at least six years 
of experience within their chamber before assuming their position and served at least six years in 
that position (Clucas, 2003).  After the adoption of term limits, the experience and tenure of 
leadership in California is now shorter.  Bowser et al. (2003) also find similar results when 
studying multiple termed legislatures against non-termed legislatures.  Of those studied, which 
included Illinois, non-termed legislative leaders entered the position with an average of twenty-
four years of prior experience within their chamber, where the amount of experience in termed 
legislatures was just six years.  With the lack of experience and tenure we can expect there to be 
a lack of leadership in term limited legislatures.  Considering that the average tenure for a 
legislative leader was six years, every six years there was a new style of legislative leadership for 
the members to adjust to.  Term limit critics argue that this lack of experience lowers legislative 
performance. 
 
Clucas (2003) finds that in California the committee chairs average less experience than 
that of the general membership.  In the past, chairs in the California legislature typically had ten 
or more years of experience.  Following the adoption of term limits the average fell to four years 
or less in the chamber they were currently serving.  In their study, Sarbough-Thompson et al. 
(2004) found that chairs are often less autonomous, less prepared to deal with the inherent 
conflict within committees, and have less expertise about policies the committee deals with.  
Although committee members still viewed their chairs as influential, they were less likely to rely 
on them for information and guidance.  
 
In Maine in the 1990s before term limits, the average chair in the lower house had four 
terms of experience.  After term limits were adopted in 2000, the average experience of a 
chairperson was less than two terms (Moen and Palmer, 2003).  So even for a relatively 
unprofessional legislature, the average tenure of committee chairs declines by over two terms. 
This decline was accompanied by a thirty-three percent increase in the number of bills coming 
out of committee which displays their lack of responsibility as “gatekeepers.”  The authors 
attribute this to the lack of experience of the committee members as well as the committee chairs 
and their perceived obligation that bills and their sponsors should have a chance to be presented 
on the chamber floor.   
 
Accountability 
Another issue for term-limited legislatures is accountability.  One sure way to get the 
attention of a career representative is to jeopardize their reelection in some way.  Another 
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concern of term limit critics is that all representatives serve their last term in office as lame 
ducks, or may be considered lame ducks once they enter office.  Critics argue that this could 
result in representatives being less responsive to their constituents as they no longer have to 
worry about garnering enough votes to win reelection. In their study of Michigan’s House of 
Representatives, Sarbaugh-Thompson at al. (2004) found that lame duck legislators decrease 
their participation in citizen related activities in general, such as communicating with 
constituents, attending events in their district, and devoting time to insure their district gets its 
fair share of resources (see also, Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 1998).  In the rare cases they found 
legislators attending events in their district, it was in connection with a bid to run for another 
political office.  The bottom line depends on how lame duck legislators govern when they know 
they have to leave office.  Accounting for divided government, Clucas (2003) found the number 
of bills introduced and enacted in California declined since the adoption of term limits.  But does 
this mean there has been a reduction in the passage of important bills? Well in the case of 
budgeting the answer is yes. Clucas (2003) finds that the California legislature has been much 
worse at passing a budget bill since the implementation of term limits.  Even recently, California 
was on the short list of states in 2009 that did not approve a state budget on time (“Numbers”, 
2009).   In fact, California’s budget ranked the worst among the states in 2009 (Mayerowitz and 
Tadena, 2009). 
 
 
 
Interest Group Pressure 
Legislative reformers fault lobbyists and interest groups for corrupting the legislative 
process.  They are also viewed negatively by the public at large.  However, critics of term limits 
claim that lobbyists and interest groups are an integral part of the permanent government and 
will be strengthened in their dealings with novice legislators.  To study the impact of term limits, 
Moen and Palmer (2003) studied the relationship between lobbyists and legislators in Maine 
before and after their adoption.  They found that the job of lobbyists is often more difficult, even 
in the citizen legislature of Maine.  Other studies also concur that the environment created by 
term limits makes it more difficult for lobbyists to do their work, with the influx of new 
legislators and the distrust these legislators have for lobbyists (Mooney, 2007).  However, Moen 
and Palmer (2003) find that while lobbyists often struggle to adjust to new legislators, high-
profile lobbyists can effectively meet the challenge.  Likewise, Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 
(2004), who studied the professional legislature of Michigan, find legislators rely more on 
lobbyists and special interests for voting direction and information after term limits are adopted.  
Thus, although the nature of the relationship between lobbyists and legislators may change, it 
would not appear term limits take special interests out of the policy making process or reduce 
their influence materially.   
 
Unintended Consequences 
            Studies also have found a number of unanticipated, but significant results.  For instance, 
Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. (2004) find that in Michigan there was a shift in the balance of power 
after the implementation of term limits.  The researchers (2004) find that with new legislators 
constantly being introduced to the chambers, there has been a shift in power to the governor, 
bureaucracy, and lobbyists in Michigan.  Kousser (2005) also finds support for this shift in 
power toward the executive branch following the adoption of term limits.  Sarbaugh-Thompson 
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et al. (2004) warn that the shift in power toward the executive branch can jeopardize basic 
checks and balances, a crucial aspect to our government’s structure.  
 
Term limits change the distribution of power in the legislature. Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 
(2004) find that party caucus leaders become more powerful and it becomes more important for 
legislators to broker their initiative through party leadership.  Kousser (2005) also found support 
for this intra-legislature power shift in the number of bills passed by individuals.  In California, 
Maine, and Oregon, and to some degree in Colorado, term limits resulted in fewer bills 
sponsored by individual members, particularly by the rank-in-file.  Furthermore, terms limits 
resulted in less innovative legislation in these states. 
  
Term limits also affect how constituents relate to their state representatives.  Niemi and 
Powell (2003) found that constituents were less knowledgeable of who their legislator was and 
about how to contact them.  If constituents have difficulty remembering their representative’s 
name, it may also be the case that they will have difficulty measuring their successes and 
failures, making retrospective voting, voting based on the elected official’s past record, more 
difficult and unlikely.  Powell, Niemi, and Smith (2007) also found that legislators were more 
inclined to follow their conscience than listen to their constituents in term limited states. 
  
Support for term limits continues to be mixed.  Unlike referendum and recall, term limits 
have been revoked in some states.  In 2002, Idaho after being revoked by the legislature earlier 
that year, the electorate voted down the proposition to reinstate term limits (Bowser and 
Moncrief, 2007).  However, in other states support for term limits is strong.  Nebraska voters, for 
instance, approved term limits in 2000 for the fourth time, the other three attempts were 
overturned by the state courts (Bowser and Moncrief, 2007).  When given the opportunity to 
make term limits less restrictive on the number of years served, Arkansas and Montana voters 
voted down the option in favor of shorter term limits (Bowser and Moncrief, 2007).  Kousser 
(2005) sums up term limits effects on the professionalized legislator, “…whatever a higher level 
of professionalism produces more of, term limits has reduced.”  In this sense a less 
professionalized legislature is one that is less experienced and knowledgeable, one with less 
citizen-legislator interaction, one that considers less innovative legislation, and one whereby the 
rank-and-file carry less weight in a legislature that is less well equipped to stand up to the 
executive branch.  In other words, term limited legislatures more closely fit the amateur 
legislature than the professional legislature model. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Following the impeachment and conviction of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, newly 
sworn in governor, Pat Quinn, appointed the Illinois Reform Commission.  That committee, after 
holding statewide hearings, recommended making changes in six areas: campaign finance, 
procurement, enforcement, government structure, transparency, and ways for inspiring better 
government.  In terms of structural reform, the committee examined a number of reforms 
concerning redistricting, budgeting, the sponsorship of legislation, and several direct democracy 
practices. This paper has focused on referenda, initiatives, recall, and term limits. 
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 The IRC was cautious in reviewing direct democracy reforms like the initiative, recall, 
and term limits for use in Illinois.  The commission recommended further study into the prospect 
of referenda as a means to enact reform on Illinois’ elected officials (Illinois Reform 
Commission, 2009).  While the justification is sound, as elected officials are unlikely to reform 
on their own, the expansion of the referendum process must be treated with caution.  Many of the 
claims made by proponents have not been proven in the real world and there tend to be several 
unintended consequences.  The referendum and initiative process is not only crowded with 
special interests, but often run by those with deep pockets and a wealth of resources.  The 
initiative process incites warm feelings of mass citizen involvement, door knocking, fundraising, 
and petitioning.  In reality, the involvement of average voters is considerably less, and the clout 
of major interest groups and “big money” often increases.   
 
 Relatively low public participation in the initiative process opens the door to abuse and 
special interest influence and precludes the initiative from addressing the governing 
shortcomings and corruption plaguing Illinois for decades.  Illinois’ current referendum 
procedures may well be adequate and all that can be expected.  In November of 2010 the 
electorate will vote on a proposal which if approved will amend the constitution to allow recall 
of elected officials.  In the wake of the arrest and impeachment of Governor Blagojevich, the 
Illinois General Assembly did move to take some corrective measures.  Although the recall was 
unpopular among elected officials, they did move to put the question on the ballot for voters to 
decide.  Therefore, it is in the opinions of the authors of this paper that the referendum process is 
already capable of addressing serious wrongs and that it should not be further loosened and risk 
providing an additional avenue for organized interests to circumvent the system. 
  
 The IRC found that the recall holds greater promise and a majority supported its 
adoption.  However, since there was not unanimous support the commission could not 
recommend the proposal.  The procedures for a recall election usually require a high threshold of 
signatures for placing the petition on the ballot.  This makes the recall one of the most difficult 
direct democratic provisions to use.  Although states beginning in the early 1900s adopted recall 
provisions, only two governors have been recalled.  This paper has provided a very limited 
examination of the most famous cases, i.e. the 2003 recall of Governor Gray Davis and his 
replacement with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.  An examination of other state experiences 
with the recall raises the specter of abuse of this process by special interests during the signature 
drives and election.  However, the balance of the evidence of its actual use argues that such 
abuse is unlikely and misplaced malicious reasoning recalls die at the voting booth.  Therefore, 
the authors support the adoption of House Joint Resolution Constitutional Amendment 31 
(HJRCA0031) providing for recall elections in Illinois.  The authors believe this would be a step 
in the right direction as it includes a high petition requirement, 15% of the number of voters that 
voted in the last gubernatorial election; 30 total legislators (20 from the House, 10 from the 
Senate) must sign the petition, 15 from each party; a honeymoon period of 6 months for the 
sitting governor; a special election; a limit of one petition attempt against a governor per term; 
and a separate special primary election held for replacement candidates.  While HJRCA31 has its 
potential drawbacks, it only allows for recall of the governor, it is a step in the right direction and 
has been drafted with an eye towards non-partisan bias and practicality.   
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 The Commission also found a majority of support for legislative term limits.  As two 
authors stated on legislative term limits, “to know them is not to love them” (Weissert and 
Halperin, 2007).  The authors of this paper agree that term limits have not realized their 
promises.  As described in detail in the paper, term limits are often coupled with low constituent 
interaction and shifts in the balance of power between the legislative and executive branch.  
Illinois now possesses one of the strongest governorships in the United States and the thought of 
shifting even more power to the governor will definitely raise some concerns.  And while much 
to the authors’ relief, it did not recommend legislative term limits as a whole, the Commission 
did recommend term limits on legislative leadership.   
  
 This proposal is justified by the fact that voters have no control on who occupies these 
legislative leadership positions since the respective parties vote on their leaders.  These leaders 
also hold a significant amount of power within their chambers.  No one questions the power of 
House Speaker Michael Madigan in Illinois.  Bills often live and die by the legislative leaders’ 
hands.  In the middle of the 2010 session for example, House Speaker Michael Madigan pushed 
a controversial pension reform bill through committees and both chambers in a single day.  
However, would limiting the amount of time a leader serves in this leadership position limit the 
amount of power the position holds?  Most likely, it will not.  As the point is made in many of 
the studies on legislative term limits, when the leader is nearing the end of his or her term, the 
caucus focuses on recruiting another qualified and powerful leader.  As long as the caucuses 
have the power to elect their own leaders, it can be assumed these leaders will be highly 
experienced and powerful.  For these reasons, the authors also do not recommend that term limits 
on legislative leadership positions be adopted.   
 
In summary, these legal and structural reforms are often popular with the public, but 
rarely live up to their expectations.  At first glance, these reforms seem like a quick and lasting 
answer to corruption.  They promise to save the electorate from the highly sensationalized 
downfalls of our government.  This brief literature review highlights the fact that the solution is 
not a simple one.  While the authors find recall elections to be permissible, term limits and the 
expansion of the referendum process raise more problems than they solve.  The founders 
instituted a representative democracy and making it work is a constant challenge for each 
successive generation.  It is important to keep in mind that our government is just that, 
representative.  Term limits, initiatives, and referenda put the benefits of our representative 
democracy at risk.  The founders anticipated the possible downfalls of direct democracy when 
they put the current framework of checks, balances, and competitive elections into place.  Illinois 
is experiencing unacceptable levels of government corruption and paralysis. But however 
popular these reforms may be with the public, experience shows they likely will exacerbate 
rather than alleviate the state’s current ethical and budget woes  
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